The role of commercial banks in enterprise restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe by Long, Millard & Rutkowska, Izabela
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1423
The Role of Commercial  InCentIar,d  Eatern
B  Europe,.banksare.lesslacUveA;
Banlks  in Enterprise  ns''''plannedn,
estruturiG  ro wate'-
Restructuring in Central
and  Eastern Europe
restructure  h  a6t 
Millard  Long  dient'  istoidircta  io
Izabela  Rutkotwska  . fm  lendinO
S.  m~~~~~~~~~~~~.9
resti  -uctured  not  banor9
governmen4gnlsb~~
The World Bank
Financal  Sector  Developmet Department  7B-i
Financal  Sector Policy  and Istiions  Unit
















































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER 1423
Summary  findings
Many countries in Central and Eastcrn Europe assigned  except under government  directive, are avoiding  nmaking
banks the responsibility  for restructuring enterprises.  new loans to loss-making  enterprises. Together withi  a
Such restructuring had five components:  cut in fiscal  subsidies,  this is imposing a harder budget
* Triage of enterprises into three classes:  viable,  viable  constraint on the enterprises. Nonviable enterprises scem
with debt relief, and nonviable.  more likely  to starve to death than to die through
- Work with management  of overindebted firms on a  execution.
restructuring plan beforc granting debt relief.  Corporate restructuring  is not a normal part of
* Trigger the bankruptcy-liquidation  proccss  on  commercial  banking.  To ask banks to restructure  weak
nonviable firms.  enterprises  is to direct their attention away from what
* Fund new investments  needed as part of physical  should be their core business: lending to strong
restructuring.  enterprises. In fact, banks are under attack for being
* Provide corporate governance through  excessively  conservative.
representation on boards of directors.  Enterprise restructuring  is taking place in Central and
The initial information is that banks are performing  Eastern Europe driven by the disintegration  of regional
these roles only to a limited degree. Signals  are mixed on  trade relations, sharply higher input prices, falling
how vigorously  governments want banks to pursue  domestic  demand, inflation,  and other economic
bankruptcy proceedings.  With littlc opportunity to  dislocations  in combination  with the harder budget
recover funds, banks  are accepting even dubious  constraint. Thus far the restiucturing has been more
restructuring programs from enterprises. But banks,  downsizing  than making new investments.
This  paper  - a product  of the Financial  Sector  Policy  and Institutions  Unit,  Financial  Sector  Development  Departcnt  -is  part
of a larger  effort  in  the department  to study  the role  of banks  in  restructuring.  Copies  of  the paper  are available  free  from the  World
Bank,  1818  H Strect  NW,Washington,  DC  20433. Pleasc  contact  Rosamund  Garner,  room G8-127,  extension  37670  (18  pages).
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Summary and Conclusion
There is much talk today in Central and Eastem Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union
(FSU) about bank-led enterprise restructuring.  Bank led restructuring  consists of five pans:  first,
banks using their authority as creditors are meant to sort enterprises into three classes, namely fully
viable firms, firms that could be viable with debt relief and non-viable  firmJ/ (or parts of firms).
Second, for firms which could be made viable with debt reduction, banks are supposed  to work with
management to produce a restructuring  plan and on the basis of that plan grant the necessary  debt
relief.  Third, banks are expected  to take legal action on the non-performing  loans of non-viable
fins,  triggering the liquidation-bankruptcy  process.  Fourth, for the fully viable firms rdd those
viable after debt relief, banks are expected to provide loans to finance new investments needed as part
of the physical restructuring. Fifth, banks are expected  to sit on boards of directors to assist
enterprises in corporate governance.
The initial infonration - which is fragmentary  at best - is that the banks are perfomiing these
roles only to a limited degree.  Starting with the last items, active involvement  of  banks in corporate
govemance in CEEJFSU and bank financing of investment  seem to be the exception, not the rule.
But even for the earlier stages of restructuring, banks are less active in their implementation  than
planned.  The signals to banks on how vigorously to enforce foreclosure  on non-viable enterprises are
certainly niixed.  Hence, when banks see little possibility  to recover funds through foreclosure
proceedings, they appear to be accepting  enterprise restructuring  programs, regardless of their views
on the firms' long-run viability. What the better banks do seem to be doing, and this is important, is
to refrain from providing new credits to loss-making  enterprises, except under government directive.
11  The  third class  can be further  subdivided  into firms  that are  value-subtracting  with revenues  not adequate  to
cover  the cost of purchased  inputs  and another  class  of somewhat  better  firms  that  can  cover  the costs  of non-labor
inputs  plus some.  though  not all, wages.2
Because  the size of fiscal subsidies  to enterprises  has beer, cut, non-viable  firms are likely to starve to
death, rather than die through a sharp execution.
That the banks are playing a less active role than plamed in enterprise restructuring is not
surprising. In most countries the main business  of banks consists  of providing  financial services,
including  payment and deposit facilities and short-term commercial  lending. Though commercial
banks in developed countries might occasionally  be invulved  in restructuring  a troubled client,
corporate restructuring is not a major  part of the commercial  banking  business. In CEE/FSU banks
are still weak both in terms of finance  and skills.  To ask the banks to restructure enterprise is to
direct their attention away from what should be their core business, that is lending to their strongest
clients rather than restructuring the weakest. It is not surprising that banks appear to be less active in
restructuring  firms than called for in govermnent  programs.
Restructuring  of enterprises  is taking place in CEE/FSU, but it is not bank led.  Nor is it being
driven by government  agencies. Industrial  output is down by 40% and industrial  employment  is
down by one-third. But that adjustment  has been driven by market forces - the disintegration of
regional and CMEA trade relations, sharply higher (non-subsidized)  input prices,  opening  to
international competition and falling domestic  demand, inflation  and other economic  dislocations  -
and reductions in direct subsidies. Thus far the adjustment  has been defensive,  responding to
deteriorating  economic conditions  rather than active  restructuring with new investments  to reorganize
production lines. Because  the countries  were overindustrialized  at the start of reform, most of the
unemployed  will be reemployed.  not in industry but in the service sectors as the economies recover.
A strategy to stabilize  the macro economy  and strengthen  institutions  and markets must be the
centerpiece  of financial and enterprise  reform.  Stabilizing  the economy,  lowering risk, and
developing  self-correcting  mechanisms  will largely depend upon improving  fundamentals: better
information  on all aspects  of the system, building financial  and risk management  skills, putting in
place laws, regulations and oversight  institutions  to monitor and safeguard  the financial system,
clarifying  property rights, making financial  contracts enforceable,  etc.  New lending programs or
institutions  may complement  but cannot  substitute for the fumdamental  infrastructure  needed for a
market based financial system. Putting in place the critical infrastructure  should receive top priority.
Introduction
At the onset of transformation,  the econonies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union were highly distorted  and over-industrialized.  The incentive  structures were perverse
and not capable  of transmitting  information  on resource scarcity; individual  enterprises were using
resources inefficiently;  and imany  industrial  products were not competitive  in world markets.  A3
massive restructuring of industry was needed  as part of restructuring the economy. This included
down-sizing  the industrial  sector to free resources for the service sector, down-sizing  or liquidating
inefficient  enterprises, finding  new markets, and introducing  new products and more efficient
production methods, etc.
No single paper can hope to capture the breadth  of experience in the past four years in CEE and
the FSU with bank and enterprise restructuring. At the country level the approaches,  implementation
capacity, and the degree of progress have differed. Rather this paper outlines some of the common
policy issues and problems arising in these countries, focussing  specifically  on the role of banks in the
financial restructuring of enterprises. In the discussion  on transformation  the tern  "restructuring"  has
been used to refer to physical changes  in production  processes, organizational  changes  including
corporatization  and privatization,  and to financial  changes  in corporate balance  sheets.  In order to
reduce the confusion somewhat,  we shall distinguish  among the different aspects  of restructuring.  Of
course, the various aspects  are related and financial  restructuring can force physical changes.
The Macroeconomic  hnIetus for Resbuctine  of Enterses
The first stage of the adjustment  process in CEE/FSU has been driven by traumatic economic col-
lapse.  The disintegration  of regional and CMEA trade relations, sharply higher energy  prices, high
inflation, and severe economic  dislocation  reduced  demand forcing the downsizing  of the industrial
sectors.  Between 1989 and 1993 GDP in real terns fell by 30% in CEE and 40% in FSU.  Industrial
production in most countries declined  by 40% and industrial employment  by at least one third (see
Annex Tables I and 2 and Figure 1).
Most of the decline in industrial employment  is permanent. The socialist countries were over-
industrialized  with very small service sectors.  Services  accounted  for only 30-40% of GDP as against
over 60% in typical market economies (see Annex Table 3)._/  A decline in industrial employment
was certain as the economies  shifted resources to the service sectors.  That it came so rapidly has led
to high unemployment. As the transforming economies  recover from the present depression, most of
those laid off will be reemployed,  not in industry, but in the service sectors.31
2/  For example,  in 1988  Polish  industry  accounted  for 61%  of GDP, whereas  in OECD  the average  at the time
was  33 % (see  ThIe  Economist.  Book  of Vital  World  Statistics.  New  York,  1990).  Moreover,  the  industrial  sector
was excessively  concentrated  and reliant  on very large  firms. In 1990  nearly  half of the Polish  workforce  was
employed  in enterprises  with between  500 and 2500  workers  and most of fte remainder  worked  in enteprises
employing  over  2500.
3/  In Poland  and Hungary  over 50%  of the  workforce  is now  in the  private  sector  and  newly  established  private
firms  tend  to be concentrated  in the trade  and service  sectors.4
At the onset of reform it was stated that many firms could becomne  insolvent  because of their high
level of indebtedness. Because  use of debt as a means  of finance had been rather arbitrary under the
socialist system, the level of indebtedness  did not reflect long run enterprise viability. One suggestion
was to write off a large part of the existing debts, particularly  at the time of privatization.  Without
going into the pros and cons of this approach, in practice the original debts were written down
substantially in most countries, not by explicit debt forgiveness  but by inflation which eroded  the real
value of debts (see Figure 1 ).  Enterpriscs, which today are highly indebted, have borrowed heavily
since the reform process began, usually  to cover losses. Hence the distribution of debt today is more
reflective of enterprise performance.
Inflation, which has been high in CEE and very high in FSU, is a two-edged  sword in enterprise
finance.  On the one hand it does reduce the value of enterprise debt, partiularly  where the rate of
interest is less than inflation. But it also reduces the real value of deposits. To avoid the tax imposed
by inflation, those who held financial assets shifted to dollars, to foreign deposits, etc.  As a result the
real value of assets in the banking system declined, reducing  the ability of the banking system to
provide enterprises with resources (see Annex Table 4).  Inflation has been a major force in the
financial restructuring of enterprises.
To ameliorate  the growing unemployment  many governments  provided support to the affected
enterprises.  But after a brief initial tax surplus in the early stage of refonn,  tax revenues  collapsed,
reducing the capacity of governments  to provide relief.  Large fiscal deficits which fed inflation
forced  governments  to cut enterprise subsidies.  Furthermore, inflation cut the real value of bank
lending so that subsidies  through the banking system also were eroded.  The cut in both fiscal and
financial subsidies put further pressure on the enterprises  to adjust to the decline in demand.
Loss-making  enterprises reacted to the imposition  of a harder budget constraint by creating their
own subsidies, that is by not paying banks, other enterprises, the tax authorities, and the social secu-
rity system.  The estimates  of bad debts in bank portfolios  in CEE countries are in the range of 20 -
40% of total loans, with considerable  variation by country and bank.  Slowly these arrears loopholes
are being tightened as well, as the countries simply can not afford to finance large enterprise losses.
As the fiscal authorities have to cover the cost of bank recapitalization,  most govermments  have acted
to stem further losses by directing banks to stop lending to insolvent enterprises.
Industrial adjustment  has been driven by brutal market forces, not bank or goverrnent programs.
Devastating economic  shocks coupled with declining  fiscal subsidies and the real value of bank credits
have forced adjustment at the enterprise level.  The adjustments  thus far have been defensive,
responding to deteriorating  economnic  conditions  rather than active physical restructuring with new
investment  to reorganize  production. That remains for the future.5
AMnuoadhes  to Restructurin.  - Bank Restucturing
Each transitional economy has taken a somewhat different approach to restructuring banks and
enterprises and coordinating the linkages between the two efforts.  Most CEE countries decided to
follow a bottom-up approach to industrial restructuring and a top-down approach to banking reform.l/
The government would control the reorganization of banks, while market forces were to play a larger
role in forcing restructuring of enterprises. Banks were to be restructured either prior to, or
contemporaneously  with, the restructuring of the enterprises. The direct restructuring of banks and
indirect restructuring of enterprises were to be undertaken in conjunction  with four major policy
changes: ronely,  macro-economic  stabilization  to create appropriate  conditions for restructuring,
liberalization of relative prices to provide appropriate signals for decision making, privatization of
enterprises to generate appropriate incentives, and introduction of a hard budget constraint to enforce
financial discipline.  We shall discuss first bankc  and then enterprise restructuring.
The inherited socialist banking systems could not provide the financial services required by
market economies.  The systems needed radical changes in their basic structure, including a new
approach to central banking, changes in interest rate policy, new banking laws, regulations and
supervision, more sophisticated  payment systems, new approaches  by banks to risk management  and
pricing, better systems for loan collection and enforcing financial contracts, opening of the financial
system to competition, etc.  These changes  were needed to provide regular banking services, but in
addition, governments asked banks to play a leading role in enterprise restructuring, that is, to
identify and liquidate nonviable enterprises, restructure viable enterprises through debt relief and new
lending, and provide guidance and direction to enterprise managers.
In the early days of the debate over financial reform, some advisers suggested that it was not
advisable to restructure state banks. Their portfolio, their bankdng  skills and their corporate culture
were considered too weak. Rather it was argued that resources should be invested in new banks,
while the old were allowed to wither away.  For the most part this advice has been rejected. The
countries of CEE chose to restructure and recapitalize most of the state banks formed out of the
monobanks5/ and make these the core of the new banking system.  The general approach followed
4/  Beyond  this generalization,  it is possible  to distinguish  several  types  of restructuring  programs. The Polish
program  assigned  a major  role  for banks  in restructuring  enterprises.  Slovenia  is taking  a similar  approach. The
Hungarian  program,  in its early  stages, relied  heavily  on strict  bankruptcy  rules to force enterprise  restructuring
but  is moving  to  bank led restructuring.  The countries  that have undertaken  mass voucher privatization,
Czechoslovakia,  Russia.  and  Lithuania  have  a different  approach.  In Czechoslovakia  the  banks  and  enterprises  were
given some  relief before being  privatized.  The banks  have not gotten  direct government  relief in Russia  and
Lithuania. In Romania  and Albania  the government  will play a larger  role in resmtturing enterprises.
5/  The split  of monobanks  into Central  and state banks  came in Hungary  in 1987, in Poland in 1989,  and in
Czechoslovadia  in 1990.6
was to hire intemational  accounting  firms to audit banks, review portfolios,  and estimate  expected
loans losses and capital requirements. The banks were recapitalized  on the basis of ex ante
expectations  of loan losses. Banks whose  collection  performance  exceeded  expectations  are allowed
to keep the profits or bear losses if collections  fall short of expectations. At the same time, banks
undertook intensive  training of staff and managers  (e.g. twinning  with westem banks in Poland).
Russia, while not completely  abandoning  the state banks, has put far more reliance on new banks.
In Russia the govermnent  licensed 2,000 new baniks,  some of which were spin-offs  of the old state
banks.  Others started anew, usually as the subsidiaries  of state enterprises. Loose licensing and
widespread  'pocket' banking in Russia is likely to have significant  costs to the economy.  However,
there are positive signs emerging from this seedbed  approach to developing  a new banking system.
The smaller enterprise banks are losing importance  as firms shift their business  to the better financial
institutions.  Today the 20 largest non-state  commercial  banks account for more than one third of total
bank assets. These growing, large commnercial  banks have recognized  banking  as a profitable busi-
ness in its own right and are attempting  to operate according to market principles.6/ These banks are
not burdened  with enterprise restructuring  and can focus on commercial  lending. The strategy
adopted  does, however, leave open the question  of how to deal with the remaining  state banks (still
equal to one-third of the system) and what to do with private banks that fail.  The Russian banking
system has already had problems with fraud and mismanagement.  Thus far about 40 banks have
failed.  Further bank failures could produce  calls for government  intervention.7/
There has been a tendency in the CEE programs to forget the early debate  and to accept
govermnent-led  restructuring  as a necessity. Careful attention should be given to the alternative non-
restructuring  strategy being followed in Russia, at least on the margin.  Not all state banks should be
restructured;  some are so weak they should be closed. Knowing  they too can fail will improve the
market discipline  of banks that do not accept  commercial  practices.
Establishing  arms-length  economic  relations among  the budget, the baiks, and the enterprises in
the aftermath  of planning is a central challenge  for the transfonration process. There is danger that
6/ This  observation  must  be treated  with  care. So  far, the  impact  of the  macroeconomic  deterioration  on the  banks
in the FSU  has been  muted  because  continuing  high inflation  is wiping  out past lending  mistakes  and the budget
constraint  on enterprs  remains soft  with  continuing  negative  real  interest  rates  and arrears  running  through  the
system. The  accounting  system  for banks  is far from  transparent  and  banking  supervision  is still  too wecak  to verify
the financial  positions  of the banks.
71 For a more  optimistic  evaluation  of developments  in the Russian  banking  system,  see G. Pohl, S. Claessens,
"Banks,  Capital  Markets  and  Corporate  Governance:  Lessons  from  Russia  for  Eastn  Europe.  " World  Bank,  May
1994.7
bank recapitalization by government will be seen as a precedem for future bail-outs.fi/ Multiple
recapitalization  of banks is likely to cause moral hazard as banks come to expect governments to
periodically take over their bad loans leading banks to be less careful about lending decisions and loan
collection.2/
While not a panacea. privatization is seen as one way to encourage commercial behavior by
banks.  There are two contrasting approaches  to privatization  of banks: (i)  privatize the banks 'as is',
i.e. without audits or restructuring; or (ii)  restructure and recapitalize state banks before
privatization.  In Poland, two of the nine banks managed to solve their bad debt problems without
government assistance and were privatized; the other banks will be privatized when the restructuring
program is completed. Immediate privatization of the banks in Poland without prior restru,:.ring  was
not considered acceptable: unreconstructed  but privatized banks would likely need government
assistance to cover debts.  Such intervention would undermine the idea of privatization.
Rapid privatization without recapitalization  was done in Latvia, Estonia and Russia.  In other
republics of the former Soviet Union state banks are being partially privatized and partially
recapitalized through selling bank shares, e.g. Moldova and Armenia.  Some of the banks privatized
without restructuring and recapitalization  are very weak and run the risk that state assistance will be
necessary in the future.  That is likely to be the case in Slovakia.  If banks are sold to sophisticated
investors - usually foreign banks - the buyers can be expected  to review the portfolio and negotiate a
price based on expected loan losses.  But that is not true with voucher privatization.  In this case
banks should be fully recapitalized  before privatization  to prevent the need for further government
intervention, which is tantamount to renationalization.
To date too little attention has been given to the questions of monopoly, scale efficiency, and the
role of specialized banks.  Some countries have either geographically specialized banks (e.g. Poland)
or too few banks to be competitive  (e.g. Slovakia)  or too many small, weak banks (Russia).  All
8/  So far, Estonia  is the only  country  where  a large  commercial  bank  has been  liquidated  without  depositors  being
satisfied  by the state.  Severl small  banks  failed  in Poland  - one was absorbed  by a larger  private  bank and the
others  were  liquidated. The  failed  banks  had almost  no household  deposits  and the  losses  were of depositors  of the
enterprises  that had loans from  the banks.
9/  The restructuring  programs  have addressed  this "moral  hazard' problem  in different  ways. In Poland, the
recapitalization  of banks  was  presented  by the government  as a one-time  event  covering  only loans  granted  under
the central  planning  regime. In Estonia  recapitalization  covered  only the losses  directly  linked  to the collapse  of
the Soviet  Union; troubled  banks  which  did not have  assets  in Russian  banks  were allowed  to go bankrupt.  In
Hungary,  on the other  hand, the  govermment  has already  injected  capital  into the  banks  several  times. To moderate
some of the negative  consequences  of moral hazard, Hungarian  banks are being asked to agree to detailed
restructuring  plans and performance  targets  to qualify  for the infusion  of additional  capital.a
countries have specialized banks (particularly the savings banks and foreign trade banks) whose role
needs reexamination.  There arc today obstacles that prevent market forces from guiding the evolution
of structure.  The most obvious is that only the savings banks have implicit deposit insurance, giving
them a monopoly on household deposits.jQI/ In Slovakia over 75 percent of lending is in the hands of
three banks and 90 percent o; household deposits are in one bank.  In many rSU Republics
enlerprises are still constrained to deal with one bank, making competition impossible.  These banks
use their control of the enterprises' payment accounts to enforce loan repayment.l  The structural
issues, being considered less urgent, have bccn left to a later time.  Yet once the banks have been
restructured and recapitalized and privatized, governments will have lost their ability to intervene,
which suggests those issues should be dealt with at the time of recapitalization.
Although there has been a flurry of activity to set up the legal framework and a regulatory
system, accounting, legal structures and bank regulation remain weak.  Implementation and
enforcement of bankruptcy proceedings are still spotty and the new regulatory institutions lack
experience and enforcement powers.  Moreover.  while human capital is high, financial skills are
spread thin in CEE/FSU.  Both  a weak regulatory/legal/informational  framework and lack of
financial skills will limit the ability of the banks to perform theL assigned role in restructuring
enterprises.
It is too early to generalize with much confidence  about commercial bank performance in
CEE/FSU.  There are signs that, even in  highly unstable and uncertain economic envirorunents, good
bank managements have been able to improve their own financial performance.  This has been more
true when inflation wiped out the value of the inherited bad debt making the quality of new lending
of paramount importance to the financial health of the banks.  Better banks stopped lending to loss
making enterprises and enforced loan collection or liquidation.  Given very wide spreads, banks that
have avoided bad loans have been profitable and have been able to make provisions against their
remaining portfolio problems.  12/
10/ This is not true in Latvia  where  a private  bank now  has attracted  about 1/3 of household  deposits.  This has
turned  out to be a very unstable  situation. The  private  bank is insolvent  but is now considered  'too big to fail."
Il/  Until there are stronger  enforcement  mechanisms  for financial  contracts,  it will be difficult  to lift the
restrictions  on sole banking  relations. Moldova  recently  experimented  with allowing  enterprises  to keep  foreign
exchange  deposits in other banks. Within  a matter  of months  it became  apparent  that enterprises  had foreign
exchange  deposits  in one bank  and  large  arrears  on loan  payments  to their  primary  banks  without  sufficiently  strong
legal infrastructure to enforce loan repayment.
12/ P. Dittus, "Corporate  Governance  in Central Europe: the Role of Banks".  Bank for International  Settlements.
Draft. 1993. There has not been a similar effort to review bank performance  in FSU, and the data would be highly
unreliable becamse  accounting reforms are still in an early stage and most banks do not correctly report expected
loan losses.9
Financial  Restructurina of'  Eterirjp
To understand the enterprise restructuring problem. it is useful to categorize enterprises according
to profitability.  The first class utf  enterprise is profitable: the second would be profitable if granted
some formi  of debt relief.  The third class of enterprise would not be profitable even with debt relief.
This last class can be further subdivided into firms that are value-subtracting  with revenues not
adequate to cover the cost of purchased inputs and another class of somewhlat  better firms that can
cover the costs of non-labor inputs plus somile,  though not all, wages.  The third class of firms require
more drastic restructuring, down-sizing, or liquidation.
In the countries where bank and enterprises restructuring is linked, the banks in their role as
creditors, are expected to divide firms into the classes mentioned and to take action accordingly.
Profitable firms required no relief.  For firms considered viable but over-indebted, banks could either
write down the outstanding debt or swap it for equity.  For the firms considered non-viable even with
debt relief, the banks are to use their power as creditors to force liquidation.  Several countries have
set up a special conciliation, that is a simplified  bankruptcy,  process giving banks special work-out
powers usually free from the intervention of other creditors.
In CEE/FSU  many of the largest loss makers fall in the category of value subtracters.
Liquidating these firns,  rather than continuing to subsidize their operations, would clearly benefit the
economy and free up assets for use by the emerging private sector.  Yet these large loss makers are
sometimes either the biggest firms or major regional employers where liquidation poses complex
social and political problems.  13  In some cases the firms which bring losses but are able to cover
costs of non-labor inputs (enterprises with positive value added) are considered to be candidates for
temporary wage subsidies;  such a selective support targeted towards firms which have some
prospects of economic viability and which operate in areas of acute distress could be treated as less
expensive than cash transfers to those laid off.  In most countries special government agencies have
been set up to handle the restructuring decisions about those enterprises that are considered too large
or too "strategic" to be managed by the banks.
Triage, coupled with financial workouts, is only the first step.  Following that, banks are
expected to finance the investments needed to restructure the viable enterprises and to play a role in
corporate governance. that is, to provide oversight of decisions taken by enterprise managers.
13/ In many  countries,  including  developed  ones, the value-subtracting  group  contains  also utilities. Because  of
very specific problems  of this group  the discussion  of possible  solutions  is beyond  the scope  of this paper.10
Banks  as Enterprise  Restructurers
It is still too early to evaluate  outcomes,  but there are several  reasons  for believing  that the banks
will not be able to carry out fully  the role assigned  in enterprise  restructuring. Information  on
enterprise  viability is still not very reliable  in some  countries,  both because  accounting  is poor and
because  implementation  of reforms  has varied  so widely.  Though  considerable  progress  has been
made in most CEE countries  in price  liberalization,  relative  prices  are more  distorted  in FSU where
economies  are still unstable  and there has been less  price and trade liberalization.  14/
Information  on firm viability  is further  clouded  by implicit  and explicit  subsidies. In the first
year of reform, it was argued  that relative  prices and other distortions  made  it difficult  to decide
which  enterprises  should  be liquidated  and which  might  eventually  become  viable.  Neither  the
balance  sheet, that is the level  of debt, nor the income  statement,  that is the level of profits, were
considered  reliable  guides  to long  run viability.  Hence  govermnents  in the first year of reform  did
little  to impose  a hard budget  constraint;  rather they continued  to provide  enterprises  with
subsidies.  15/  The budget  constraint  is much  harder today, forced  more by macro  conditions  than
govermnent  choice. However,  there  are still distortions  that cloud  the information  on enterprise
viability.  Widespread  enterprise  arrears,  management  fraud  that skims  off enterprise  income,  and
poorly designed  government  interventionsl6/  reduce  the value of enterprise  profitability  as an
indicator  of viability.
Though  better positioned  than others  in terms of information  and incentives  to make appropriate
decisions  about the financial  futures  of enterprises,  banks have  only limited  skills and experience  in
the workout  process. Moreover,  few  banks in Central and Eastern  Europe  have yet been privatized
and the instructions  to public  banks  have  been amnbiguous  on whether  governments  wished  public
banks to continue  to support  non-viable  enterprises. In some countries  banks are clearly  not in a
strong  enough  political  position  to enforce  a hard budget  constraint  on enterprises,  to work  out a full
141 The results of several  years of adjustment  in CEE are visible.  Inflation  is coming  down in the strong
reformers,  government  budget  deficits  were  lower  in 1993  than  in 1992,  and  currencies  are intemally  and externally
exchngeable. In the most  advanced  reformers,  such  as the Baltic  states,  the Czech  Republic,  Poland  and Slovenia,
the decline  in output  seems  to have  stopped,  and real wages  and unemploymnent  stabilized.  at least for now.
15/ Fan and Schaffer  found  that explicit  subsidies  amounted  to about  25% of GDP in Russia  in 1992,  with only
about one-third  of these subsidies  appearing  in the government  budget. Q. Fan, M.E. Schaffer,  "Government
Financial  Transfers  and Enterprise  Adjustment  in Russia, with Comnparisons  to Central  and Eastem Europe."
Mimeo.  World  Bank. 1994,  p.54.
16/  Some form of social safety net for the unemployed  is clearly  needed.  Unfortunately,  that support has
sometimes  been  of a kind to distort  the information  on sector  and enterprise  viability.11
restructuring  program,  or to throw into liquidation  those  enterprises  that cannot  pay their debts. The
situation  is improving  as more  banks are  privatized  and governments  introduce  incentives  for state
banks  to avoid lending  to loss-making  enterprises  and  to act more forcibly  on enterprise  restructuring.
There is a question  of inconsistency  between  the commercial  incentives  for the banks and the role
assigned  by the government  in restructuring.  At one extreme,  banks  may want to liquidate  more
firms  than governments  are willing  to allow.  17/ On the other  hand, banks have  reduced  their credit
exposure  to the weakest  firms  and may no longer  have  incentives  to undertake  time-consuming  and
costly  bankruptcy  proceedings. The mandate  to restructure  enterprises  has diverted  banks  from their
major line of business,  that is mobilizing  and allocating  short term credit. Introducing  legislation  that
allows  for universal  banking  is one thing; expecting  the banks of CEEIFSU  to actually  manage  the
restructuring  of many  enterprises  is another.18/
Banks'  Role in Financing Enterprise  Resuturin
For the most part banks are not financing enterprise restructuring.  On a voluntary basis they are
providing short term commercial credits to profitable firms with adequate collateral. For banks this is
and should be the major focus of their lending. Restructuring weak enterprises is a diversion.  Most
banks consider long-term loans to financing physical restructuring to be just too risky.  Even
profitable  enterprises  cannot  get term credit. limiting  the scope  for expansion  or rehabilitation  of
enterprises. There is a positive  aspect  to this  conservative  strategy. Bank  lending  may correctly
reflect  the best use of scarce  resources. Given  the general  excess  industrial  capacity  and the extreme
shortage  of resources  in the transforming  economies,  financing  working  capital  particularly  for the
new, private firms, probably  has a higher  expected  return dtan  most investment  finance.
17/  In CEE many  firms  are being cut off from bank credit  but bankruptcy  has not been  widely  used yet.  For
example  in Poland  over 5000 firms  had been  declared  uncreditworthy  by 1993,  but there  had been  relatively  few
bankruptcies  or liquidations.  Bankruptcies  in Hungary  are increasing,  but these  are usually  initiated  by the firm
rather  than  the banks. In FSU the bankruptcy  process  has rarely  been  used. Russia had only eight bankruptcies
in 1993. Moldova  had none.
18/ In countries  like Poland,  where  banks  are growing  increasingly  independent  of government,  they  have  become
quite aggressive  in debt collection and enterprise  liquidation,  but their role in other aspects of enterprise
restructuring  remains  limited.  The  survey of Polish  enterprises  by Pinto  and van  Wijnbergen  (1994)  led  the  authors
to conclude  that "banks  played  a powerful  role in disciplining  enterprises". It is important  to note, however,  that
the banks started  to use their  power  in executing  financial  discipline  on enterprises  only  after  their own  governance
changed  as a consequence  of  banking reform at the end of  1991.  In this reform the state banks were
conunercialized  (supervisory  boards  were established)  and brought  under control  of Ministry  of Finane.  There
were two important implications  of these  changes: (i) for the first time the banks  were audited  by international
auditing  firms and the problem  of bad debts  was  disclosed,  (ii) in October  1991  the Ministry  of Finance  forbade
lending  to the firms in trouble. The conclusion  from this is that the adjustment  of banks  was forced  by rigorous
execution  of administrative  decision.  (B. Pinto, S. van Wijnbergen,  'Ownership  and  Corporate  Control  in Poland:
Why State  Firms Defied  the Odds." Mimeo. The  World  Bank, April 1994.)12
There is a tendency  to shortcut  the development  of fundamentals  and to establish  new lending
programs  and new financial  institutions  to address  real and perceived  market  imperfections. In most
of the countries  proposals  are being  put forward  to establish  development  banks  to provide  the term
financing  unavailable  from commercial  banks.  Such  proposals  should  be carefully  scrutinized. The
new institutions  will suffer from many  of the same  problems  as the banks,  i.e. they often  are public
sector  institutions,  with rather  unclear  mandates,  facing  the same  environmental  issues  as banks,  and
suffering  from the same lack  of skilled  staff. The newly  forned institutions  have  no special
infornation  or skills  that will enable  them  to judge risk and returns  better  than the existing
commercial  banks. Though  in some  cases  new  programs  or institutions  may be able to overcome
market  inperfections,  there is reason  to believe  that  a proliferation  of special  programs  and
institutions  will add to rather  than  overcome  these  imperfections. There is a real danger  that govern-
ment run development  banks,  in the present  enviromnent,  could  become  a window  of soft  finance  to
money  losing  enterprises.
In fact the most serious  problem  in credit  allocation  in CEE/FSU  is not a shortage  of credit for
investment  finance  but continued  lending  by public  banks to non-viable  enterprises  usually  at
government  behest. Such  subsidies  channel  resources  away  from their most productive  uses.
However,  a cost of transformation  is both the error of continuing  to lend  to nonviable  firms  and
failure  to fmance  potentially  viable  firms.
Banks'  Role in Corporate  Governance
The expectation  that banks  would  play a direct  role in corporate  governance  seems  to be
happening  only to a limited  degree. Banks  are disciplining  firms  through  their power  to withdraw
short term credit lines  and/or initiate  the conciliation/bankruptcy  process. Banks  are playing  a larger
governance  role for those  few  firms in which  they  have  acquired  an equity  interest  through  a debt for
equity  swap. In addition,  Czech banks  exercise  governance  through  the investment  funds  they  run.
There are still gaping  holes  in corporate  governance  of the enterprise  sector. The most profitable
firms are finding  strategic  investors  in the form  of foreign  corporations  and  domestic  investment  funds
to take over governance. Most  govermnents  are setting  up special  property  agencies  to exercise  their
ownership  responsibilities  for those  enterprises  remaining  in public  hands. These  state agencies  are
overstretched  and control  has been  loose. Establishing  corporate  governance  for the loss-makers  is
proving  difficult. Strategic  investors  are not interested.  The lack  of effective  corporate  governance
for the large  loss-makers  remains  a serious  problem.
It is difficult  to reach strong  conclusions  on the basis  of weak  information.  But the available
evidence  does  seem  to indicate  that  banks are performing  to only a limited  degree  the role of
enterprise  restructuring. There are pressures  on banks not to force  a large  number  of enterprises  into13
bankruptcy. Regardless  of their view of firms' long run viability, banks are pursuing liquidation only
when they see a clear financial gain. Though banks may well refuse them new credits no action will
be taken against many firms with non-performing  loans.  Not execution, but slow starvation is likely
to be the fate of most non-viable enterprises. With regard to the other aspects of the role assigned to,
banks, the financing  of new investment  and providing corporate governance  seen  to be the exception,
not the rule.
Stating that banks are not fulfilling  the role of enterprise restructurers is not to argue that the role
be assigned to a govermnent  agency. In so far as possible, except for the largest firms, a
decentralized  approach appears  preferable. Rather the real impetus  to enterprise restructuring has
been, and is likely to remain, market forces, not government  programs.Figure  1
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Table 1.  Macroeconomic  Indicators  by Country
Unemp-
Real  GDP  Inflation  loyment
anuual average  change  of
annual  perwntage  change  consumer pices (%J  (%6
(%)  _  1991  1992  1993  1991  1992  1993  end 1993
Albania  -27.7  -9.7  11.0  35.5  225.9  85.0
Bulgaria  -11.7  -5.6  -3.5  333.5  82.0  72.8  17.0
Former  Chechoslovakia  -15.9  -8.5  59.0  11.0
Czech  Republic  0.5  20.8  4.0
Slovak  Republic  -3.6  15.0
Hungary  -11.9  -4.5  -1.5  34.2  22.9  22.5  12.2
Poland  -7.6  1.5  4.8  70.3  43.0  35.3  15.7
Romania  -15.1  -13.5  0.0  161.1  210.3  256.0  9.5
Slovenia  -6.0  22.9
Armenia  -11.8  -52.0  -28.0  100.0  790.0  2500.0
Azerbaijan  -0.7  -26.8  -14.4  105.6  611.3  797.5
Belarus  -1.9  -11.0  -11.7  83.5  969.0  1188.0  0.9
Estonia  -11.3  -19.3  -3.5  210.6  1069.0  89  2.8
Georgia  -20.6  -45.6  -30.0  78.5  887.5  1480
Kazakhstan  -13.0  -14.0  -10.0  147.0  2568.0  2146.9
Kyrgyz  Republic  -5.0  -19.1  -16.4  85.0  854.6  1208.7
Latvia  -8.3  -33.8  -10.1  124.4  951.2  109  6.1
Lithuania  -13.1  -37.7  -16.2  224.7  1020.3  410.4  1.7
Moldova  -18.0  -21.3  -15.0  162.0  1276.0  1340
Russian  Federation  -12.9  -18.5  -11.5  92.7  1353.0  895  1.0
Taiikistan  -8.7  -30.0  -30.0  111.6  1156.7  1869.9
Turkmenistan  4.7-  -5.3  8.5  102.5  492.9  1860
Ukraine  -11.9  -13.7  -18.0  91.2  1445.3  4927.9  0.5
Uzbekistan  -O.9  -9.5  0.0  105.0  528.0  761
Source: World  Economic  Outlook, October 1993  and May 1994, IMF.Annex
Table 2.  Macroeconomic Indicators by Region
(%)  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Real GDP  (annual  percentage  change)
Central Europe  1.5  0.2  -7.1  -12.6  -9.1  -1.6
Former U.S.S.R.  5.3  3.0  -2.3  -11.8  -17.8  -12.4
Employment  fannual  percentage  changel
Central Europe  -1.6  -5.8
Former U.S.S.R.  -0.6  -2.0
Inflation  (consumer  prices,  annual  percentge  change)
Central Europe  42.3  135.5  157.7  119.3  162.2  141.7
Former U.S.S.R.  0.3  2.3  5.4  98.1  1284.6  1224.2
Central  Government  Fiseal  Balance  (in  percent  of GDP]
Countries in Transition  -2.4  -2.6  -4.8  -10.3  -10.5  -8.0
Growth of  mroad  Money  (annual  percentage  change)
Countries in Transition  22.2  32.4  22.1  125.9  602.1  352.1
Current Account Balance  fin bNions of US  dollasJ
Central Europe  5.9  2.8  0.3  -6.1  -1.2  -6.3
Former U.S.S.R.  1.8  -6.0  -17.0  0.3  4.0  -0.2
External  Debt  fin  billions of US dollars)
Central Europe  98.2  98.3  108.4  108.6  107.4  109.4
Former U.S.S.R.  43.0  55.0  61.1  67.0  78.9  90.9
Extemal  Debt  (in  percent  of exports  of goods  and  services)
Central Europe  . 123.7  1242  150.9  174.  159.1  170.0
Former U.S.S.R.  32.5  41-.1  47.3.  65&8  114.4  117.6
Source:  Wor/d Economic  Outlook,  May  1994, IMF.
Contl  Eufope  conustm  of:
Albania,  Bulgaria,  Croatia  Czech  Republic. Form  Czechoslovakia,  Hungery
Macedonia,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovea, Fomer Yugosavi
Fomer  U.S.S.R.  consId of:
Arnenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Estonia,  Gerogia,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyz  Repubffic,
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Moldova.  Russia,  Tajfifstan.  Turkmnenien,  Ukraine, UzbekistanAnnex
Table 3.  Industrial Output and Services as % of GOP
Increase
Industry  Services  (1989-1992)
1%)  1989  1992  1989  1992  Industry  Services
High-ncome economies
France  29.2  67.3
Germany  39.1  59.2
Italy  33.9  62.6
Spain  35.3  59.9
Ireland  9.5  79.5
Transitional economies
Poland  52.4  46.6  34.7  41.9  -5.8  7.2
Hungary  36.4  29.5  50.0  63.4  -6.9  13.4
Czechoslovakia  52.6  37.9
Bulgaria  59.4  44.7  29.7  41.4  -14.7  11.7
Romania  59.2  46.4  26.9  33.7  -12.8  6.8
Slovenia  0.0
Estonia  43.9  48.8  36.3  34.1  4.8  -2.2
Latvia  44.6  52.9  36.1  23.2  8.2  -13.0
Lithuania  44.9  27.9
Russia  48.2
Kazakhstan  34.2  37.2
Uzbekistan  40.2  38.2  -2.0
Armenia  54.6  34.0
Middleincome  economies
Greece  27.1  55.9
Turkey  35.4  30.0  47.9  55.4  -5.4  7.5
Mexico  32.3  28.4  60.0  63.2  -3.9  3.2
Low-income economies
India  29.1  27.4  39.6  40.2  -1.7  0.6
Malawi  19.5  21.8  45.6  50.0  2.3  4.4
Nicaragua  21.2  19.3  46.7  50.3  -2.0  3.6
Source: World Tables, The World Bank, 1994.
* industry is defined as mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas and watePolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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